One can only imagine the astonishment in Ottawa when a letter arrived from Washington, reminding the Canadian government that military procurement projects are about procuring military equipment, not creating Canadian jobs. I like to imagine flabbergasted bureaucrats reading the letter over and over, before finally putting it down, rubbing their temples and musing aloud, “Don’t the Americans realize how things are done here?”
They do, it seems. And they don’t like it.
On Monday, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute published a new report, “Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada’s Fighter Replacement Fiasco.” The title tells you most of what you need to know about the tone of the report. Author Richard Shimooka recaps the long and embarrassing history of Canada’s inability to properly replace our rapidly aging and slowly attritting fleet of almost-40-year-old CF-18 jets. The report mostly covers a story that’s been oft-told, including here in the National Post. But it did break some news: apparently, Washington’s frustration with Canada is boiling over, and it’s not keeping quiet about it anymore.
Shimooka’s report reveals the existence of two letters previously unknown to the public, sent last year by American officials to Canadian counterparts. The specifics of the complaints involve fairly legalistic and technical aspects of Canada’s membership in the international consortium that helped finance the development of the F-35 stealth fighter. Suffice it to say that Canada, as a participating nation, gets access to a rock-bottom price for the fighter (meaning the same cost paid by the U.S. military) and Canadian firms have been part of the production of the planes from the very beginning. That’s the deal. It’s a pretty good one.
But Canada wants a different deal. Specifically, it wants the same kind of deal it always insists on when buying military equipment from abroad. We want any foreign company we’re purchasing equipment from to invest heavily in
You’ll note that in the above paragraph on military procurement, there was very little emphasis on actually successfully procuring equipment for the Armed Forces. Ottawa is much too sophisticated for that kind of concern. The real action is in the jobs, the industrial benefits, the gigantic novelty cheques, the ribbon cuttings, the question period talking points and the partisan mailers crowing about all the money flowing to Canadian firms. That’s what military procurement is really for, at least in the eyes of Canadian officials. That’s why our national shipbuilding strategy was to first build out a shipbuilding industry and then build some ships, almost as an afterthought, when we could have bought them faster and almost certainly cheaper from an ally.
The Americans, it seems, have had enough, and are threatening to pull the F-35 from consideration in Canada’s upcoming program to select our next fighter. To their mind, Canada has already been offered an objectively good deal: access to one of the world’s most advanced fighter jets at the same cost the U.S. military pays, and billions in industrial benefits. It’s true that the F-35 program has been troubled, but most of those problems are now behind it. These jets are entering service in large numbers in the U.S. military and in allied forces, as well. The F-35 isn’t perfect but it’s available, now, and Canada has already paid the cost of entry to the club. Angling for a better deal than everyone else is
Now a cynic will say that it’s just good business. There’s nothing wrong with Canada trying to get the best deal for itself. In general, I have an open mind to this kind of argument. But Canada isn’t a business. It’s a country that has signed alliances and agreements with our democratic peers, theoretically in good faith. We have our own interests, to be sure, but we also have obligations. Canada’s membership in the F-35 consortium does not obligate us to buy F-35s. We’d retain the industrial benefits even if we select another fighter. But certainly it obligates us to at least honour the agreement we’ve already made?
The Liberals have never been keen on the F-35. Before the past election, they actually pledged to never purchase them, before realizing that that was an impossible pledge to keep if we actually intended to hold a fair and open competition to select the next plane. The prime minister himself once dismissively described the F-35 as a plane that didn’t work, even as the United States was putting its first squadron into active service. Part of me wonders if the Liberals are deliberately structuring our selection process to make it impossible for the U.S. to sell us F-35s. That would certainly solve that particular problem for the Liberals.
Alas, the more realistic answer is probably, as ever, the simplest one. The Canadian government is probably baffled that the Americans would object to us behaving as we always do. Military procurement in Canada isn’t about procurement, or the military, or honoring our commitments to our friends. It’s about political booty that can be flung around the country come election time. That’s just the way we do things here. Why would that ever change?
Jack’s Note: In reading this column something immediately stands out to me. That problem (and it is huge) is the ongoing practice of permitting lobbying of our MP’s, especially ministers, and it explains much about military procurement troubles. Think navy and army as well as our airforce. Think pandering politicians and secret deals made behind closed doors and all the confusion this causes.
And then think about creating a new law that prohibits the practice completely for both politicians and lobbyists and
Then (and only then) dig into the procurement fiasco itself (too many fingers in the pie) and change everything to simplify what is at present an administrative nightmare.
‘Just a suggestion’….
See Also:
(1) The Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada’s Fighter Replacement Fiasco
(2) AG report shows federal asylum processing system is a mess
(4) The health-care crisis in Canada is that nothing ever changes
(5) If you can’t fix the phones, you can’t fix the weather
(6) 2019 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada
